Amendment moved (this day): 1, in clause 1, page 2, line 14, at end insert—
‘(3A) No regulations may be made under this section unless the Secretary of State has laid before both Houses of Parliament a statement certifying that, in his or her opinion, it is no longer possible to retain membership of EURATOM or establish an association with EURATOM that permits the operation of nuclear safeguarding activity through its administrative arrangements.”—
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to certify, before making any regulations to provide for nuclear safeguarding regulations, that it was not possible to remain a member of EURATOM or have an association with it.

Steve McCabe: I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Amendment 3, in clause 1, page 3, line 3, at end insert—
‘(11) Regulations may not be made under this section unless the Secretary of State has laid before both Houses of Parliament a report detailing his strategy for seeking associate membership of EURATOM or setting out his reasons for choosing to make nuclear safeguards regulations under this Act rather than seeking associate membership of EURATOM.”
This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from using the powers under Clause 1 to set out a nuclear safeguards regime through regulations until a report has been laid before each House setting out a strategy for seeking associate membership of EURATOM or explaining why we cannot seek associate membership of EURATOM.
Amendment 8, in clause 4, page 5, line 6, at end add—
‘(5) No regulations may be made under this section until—
(a) the Government has laid before Parliament a strategy for maintaining those protections, safeguards, programmes for participation in nuclear research and development, and trading or other arrangements  
(b) the strategy has been considered by both Houses of Parliament.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to lay a report before Parliament on the protection and trading arrangements that arise from membership of EURATOM, and his strategy for maintaining them prior to making regulations concerning nuclear safeguarding.

New clause 1— Purpose—
“The purpose of this Act is to provide for a contingent arrangement for nuclear safeguarding arrangements under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the event that the United Kingdom no longer has membership or associate membership of EURATOM, to ensure that qualifying nuclear material, facilities or equipment are only available for use for civil activities (whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere).”
This new clause would be a purpose clause, to establish that the provisions of the Bill are contingency arrangements if it proves impossible to establish an association with EURATOM after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.

Patricia Gibson: I want to speak in support of amendments 1, 3 and 8 and new clause 1. The Minister knows, as certainly it is no secret, that the Scottish National party absolutely does not support the decision to leave Euratom. We have been told that it is essential and a requirement that we do so, and that we are where we are, but I urge the Minister—as I have before—to explore to the fullest possible extent the legal advice that is, at best, differing and conflicting, as that may be the best way to go.
The Prime Minister has told us, and the Minister has reiterated it, that the UK Government seek a close relationship with Euratom. I suggest that the closest relationship would be to remain a member, but if we cannot and if the Minister stretches every sinew, explores every avenue and finds that we cannot remain a member of Euratom, we want to remain an associate member, as has been pointed out. We have heard that Switzerland became an associate member of Euratom in 2014, under article 206. That arrangement could be a way in which we can continue to access funding for nuclear research.
Although safeguard regulations are certainly reserved to the UK Parliament, the Minister will know that there are areas of regulation that are devolved to the Scottish Government, for example the regulation of waste and emissions from nuclear sites. When talking about nuclear safeguards I do not feel that we can properly and safely artificially separate those areas, so I hope that the Minister will involve the Scottish Government at every stage of the Euratom negotiation process to ensure, whatever the deal, outcome or final situation, that the deal also works for Scotland.
With regard to amendment 8, we must be mindful—I am sure that the Minister is—that critical pillars of scientific research and medicine must be considered as an important part of the Bill. Following our departure  from Euratom—if that happens—the UK will have to strike new regulatory agreements with the EU and other trading partners, to continue to import nuclear materials. That will only be possible with a new regulatory system. I am tempted to quote the expert advice from Tom Greatrex, the chief executive of the Nuclear Industry Association, and of course a former Member of Parliament. He points out that
“While medical isotopes are not classed as special fissile material and so not subject to safeguarding provisions, it is not accurate to say that Euratom has no impact. They are subject”
to the treaty.
He is echoed by the president-elect of the European Association of Nuclear Medicine, who tells us:
“The transport of isotopes across borders is regulated so it is not something you can send in a package”.
There is room for question and to search for more clarity, which I hope the Minister can provide. We need to know the strategy for the trading and transportation of nuclear materials, such as fuel for reactors and isotopes. EU officials and independent experts have stated that
“these isotopes would be subject to wider Euratom rules on the trade and transportation of nuclear materials after Brexit.”
I hope that the Minister will take the concerns addressed in the amendments on board. I am very interested to hear what he has to say.

Richard Harrington: I cannot, unfortunately, confirm that, but I can confirm that it is our intention to have as close a relationship as possible with Euratom, to cover the areas that Euratom covers with us at the moment.
The Government decided to serve the article 50 notice to leave the European Union. I am not a lawyer, but I accept the legal advice on both sides and have read a lot of the commentary around it. Whatever our views on that, it has been done, and it is our job as a Government to set up a suitable regulatory regime and negotiate with Euratom the closest possible relationship.
I would like to deal with the question of associate membership. It has been used in amendments to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, which will come before the House, and it has been mentioned a lot in conversation. I have had conversations with the Chair of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, the hon. Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves), and with my right hon. Friend the Member for Wantage (Mr Vaizey).
Associate membership implies a form of membership that I am sure one would have at the finer gentleman’s clubs in London—not that I belong to any—where someone can be a member or an associate member. It is not like that, as I am sure hon. Members accept. I do not want to make too much of the terminology, because there is not an off-the-peg associate membership. There are agreements with two countries, which have been mentioned—Switzerland and Ukraine, with Ukraine being the most recent. I could go into more detail, and I am happy to if there are further questions.
Switzerland’s agreement is purely for research and development—I do not make light of that; it is a really good thing—and Ukraine’s is that and a little bit more, but neither is actually akin to Euratom membership. Those are a close form of association in their fields, but we are looking for a close form of association in every single field that Euratom covers, of which the nuclear safeguards is one element, although there are important others.

Richard Harrington: I could not have put it better myself. I am sure my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union will be delighted to have been quoted. But it is a serious point and I would confirm seriously that it is our intention to achieve exactly the same terms and conditions in this sector as we have enjoyed with the benefits of Euratom. I will make that clear tomorrow to the industry, as I have done before; I do not think that the industry would say otherwise.
We have to ensure that we are committed to nuclear co-operation. I would never joke about North Korea, but I cannot imagine that any responsible person in this Committee Room or in the whole Palace of Westminster could ever think that we could leave ourselves without nuclear safeguards, because then we would be like North  Korea. We must be able to compete internationally and do the things that decent countries do in this field. Euratom has provided that ability, and it is our full intention to ensure that that continues.
I hope that the hon. Members for Southampton, Test, for Sheffield Central and for Bristol West will withdraw their amendments. To summarise my argument, I would say that each of them would complicate or delay—in my view, to no good effect—the vital process of preparation that we are now embarking on. We are already committed to the path down which the amendments are trying to push us, so although I am sympathetic to them, I argue that they are not necessary.
New clause 1 would undermine our position in our negotiations with international partners beyond the EU. It would change the purpose of the Bill to permit arrangements for a safeguards regime to be put in place only in the wake of failure of the discussions with the EU. We need to pursue discussions bilaterally and with the IAEA now, while we await the start of negotiations with the EU on our future relationship. In fact, as I said, those discussions are well advanced. Over the past few days, several hon. Members from various parties and have asked the Government in various forums how confident we are that new bilateral arrangements can be put in place in time. Our answer is that we are indeed confident, but only as long as we can continue to push at full speed; we cannot afford to await the outcome of our discussions in Brussels.
Amendments 1, 3 and 8 would risk delaying the legislation necessary to implement the domestic safeguards regime; I do not believe that that is their intention, but that would be their effect. I will address the transition period when we consider new clause 2.
The Government’s strategy is to progress the Bill; to continue to negotiate with the EU to achieve the closest possible future association with Euratom; to continue to negotiate an agreement with the IAEA, the importance of which I cannot overstate; to continue to negotiate nuclear co-operation agreements with our key trading partners; to increase the capabilities of the Office for Nuclear Regulation to deliver a robust domestic civil nuclear safeguards regime; and to push for research and training partnership, having committed to delivering the UK share of the Joint European Torus project after withdrawal from Euratom. I hope that after hearing those arguments, Opposition Members will feel able to withdraw their amendments.

Alan Whitehead: Indeed. My point was that, if we had to train nuclear inspectors from scratch, that would take about five years. As the hon. Lady rightly says, a number of people are already familiar with the necessary areas in order to get a position as a nuclear safeguard inspector, but those people have not all had experience of nuclear safeguarding issues; they have not had to because Euratom has carried out that role.
I asked Dr Golshan whether we could steal Euratom inspectors who might want to remain in this country, assuming they were allowed to do so, when the Euratom inspection regime comes to an end and ours starts. The answer was, “Maybe, that depends.” We cannot rely on that, so we have to get inspectors from somewhere else. It may well be that we can shorten the training period considerably by converting to nuclear safeguarding people who already work in the nuclear industry and are well versed in a number of general areas, but we should not underestimate the time that that would take to get right. It is not just a simple question of going along and saying, “You’ll do, you’ll do, you’ll do. There you are. You are now nuclear safeguarding inspectors”. As I am sure the hon. Lady is aware, that is not going to work. There will be a lot of work involved in getting the inspectors in place.
Sue Ferns said that there are specific aspects of an inspector’s role to be considered:
“This is a warranted role; this is not just working in the industry. It is not just about knowledge, but experience and commanding the confidence of the companies and the organisations that you deal with, so there are very specific aspects to that role.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 35, Q69.]
She also alluded to the relatively small pool in which we are fishing. We have not just to fish in the pool; we have to fish very accurately and attract a good proportion of the people in the pool, in order to suddenly fill the gap. Consequently, she put a considerable question mark against whether it was possible for the ONR to be as ready as we would like for the tasks that we are going to give it.
I sincerely hope, as I am sure we all do, that those matters can be resolved. It may be a question of making sure that the ONR is funded to the extent that it can properly undertake the activity of fishing in a small pool, perhaps with pound notes attached to the end of the fishing line. There may be a number of other factors relating to nuclear inspection coming in. Euratom may be prepared as part of an associate agreement to lend the UK safeguarding inspectors. A number of different courses could be pursued. There is, nevertheless, a big question mark against the capacity and ability of the ONR, even with all best endeavours in place, to be properly ready in time, given its present circumstances, its possible future circumstances and how it will address those.
For that reason, it is important at the appropriate time to have a sign-off from the Secretary of State that we really have not just a regime in place, but the resources available to carry out that regime in the new circumstances it will bring up. That appropriate time would be when all the different possibilities have been explored and the different ways of doing it have been looked at. Amendment 4 essentially requires the Secretary of State to lay a statement before Parliament that he or she is satisfied at that point—not a hope that it is going to be all right, but a statement saying, “Yes, it looks like it is all right now and we can safely proceed on the basis that we know we have not only the powers in place, but the people to subsequently carry out those powers.”
Amendments 12 and 13 are associated with amendment 4. They deal with the consultations that the Bill sets out will take place and are in respect of those activities, nuclear safeguarding in general and payments towards compliance costs. I have mentioned that the Secretary of State provides some money for ONR and that some money for ONR comes from the levies it places on the nuclear industry. The Bill makes provision for the Secretary of State, by regulation, to authorise and require the ONR to make payments towards compliance costs. It states that compliance costs mean
“costs of complying with nuclear safeguards regulations or with specified provisions of nuclear safeguards regulations.”
To make those payments, the ONR must obviously get the money from somewhere, either from grants or from a levy. As the clause says, there will be consultation on that, but the clause does not say that any of those consultations should be published. Therefore, we may not know what the consultations are about, what they say or when they are completed. The amendments are both minor, but they tie the process up properly with a  little bit of ribbon, to ensure that those consultations are published and in the public domain. Then we will know what has happened in those consultations, which are potentially very important, given everything that we have said about ONR’s readiness for its purpose. The amendments ensure that the consultations are in the public domain and are properly reported and discussed.
I believe that these amendments are helpful in terms of what we know is the task in front of us, and how certain we want to be in this Committee that we are able to do what we want to do. I will go beyond calling them helpful and say that it would be irresponsible to proceed to the end of this legislation without some method of ensuring that we can deliver on what this House will have decided. I think that all hon. Members would agree that it would not be the first occasion on which this House legislated on something without securing the means to ensure it happened. In this instance it is not just a money resolution at the end of the legislation, but ensuring that an industry is equipped to do the different things that we want it to do and that it previously was not carrying out.
Again, we are in new territory, and we need particular measures in this legislation to reflect that fact. We also need to be sure, in making our way through that new territory, that we are doing so as safely and securely as possible.

Alex Norris: I rise to support the amendment. I will start by stating something that is possibly a considerable understatement as well as possibly a major statement of the obvious. It is important that the arrangements that follow from the legislation work—that the arrangements that the Office for Nuclear Regulation puts in place to transition us from Euratom as the safeguard in our British law work. It is important for the jobs involved in the supply chain, for energy security and public safety. Although that may be an understatement and a statement of the very obvious, it is not inevitable that that is the case.
My hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test referred to Dr Golshan, who is leading for the ONR, and her oral evidence to the Committee on Tuesday. I want to pull a few paragraphs out of it. The most striking was when she said:
“Our aim, currently, is to have a system in place that enables the UK to fulfil its international obligations by March 2019, which is when we intend to leave Euratom. I have been very clear in the past—I will repeat it here—that we will not be able to replicate Euratom standards on day one.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 7, Q9.]
So things will get worse before they return at some point to parity. I do not think anything in that is revelatory. The ONR and the Government have not got long to prepare. This will lead inevitably to conversations in future sittings of this Committee about what transition periods may or may not be available to the ONR for it to continue its work. Nevertheless, at its root, we need to understand that things are likely to be challenging for the ONR and for the regime that it puts in place.
As a result, it is absolutely imperative that we understand the extent of that, how we might be able to mitigate that and what support could be given from across the House. The best way to do that is through amendment 4, by fully publishing the impact assessment and by showing  the evidence from the consultation with the ONR. The amendment is supportive and Ministers will be able to be clear that the ONR had the right resources.
I know we are on a budget at the moment. I was a member of the executive board of my council in my six years before coming to this place, which was obviously on a much smaller scale than here, but I know that at budget time there can be a bit of an arm-wrestle where even close friends have disagreements about priorities. It will be no surprise to hear me say I suspect that even happens at the highest level of Government. The amendment would strengthen the hand of Ministers to make sure that the ONR is properly equipped so that on day one the standards are as good and safe as they can be, and so that the gap that Dr Golshan talked about is closed as quickly as possible.
I will try not to duplicate anything quoted by my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test, but forgive me if I do. There were clear warning signs in the oral evidence about how difficult it will be to get the basic personnel who will be so important. My hon. Friend touched on this, but Dr Golshan said that
“it has not been necessary for the UK and ONR to build capacity and resilience in this area.”
We have unwittingly deskilled ourselves over previous decades, so we are having to break that very quickly. She mentioned the success in recruiting so far:
“We know that we are dealing with a limited pool of expertise, and our success so far, although encouraging, is by no means the end of the story.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 5, Q3.]
She continues that theme later on. Although they are not looking for large numbers, she states:
“we are dealing with a limited talent pool...the expertise is unique...the UK as a whole has not had to focus on developing resilience in this area, so we are limited in what and who we can recruit.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 7, Q8.]
So the ONR has a real job on. Having talked to her, that was very clear. I have no doubt we will play this out when we return to future clauses that talk about transition. It means that two things are imperative: first, that Ministers and we, as legislators, are assured that those day-one safeguards will be the best they can be; and secondly, that the ONR is being properly resourced to do this job. The best way to do that is to lay before Parliament a statement, as referenced in amendment 4.
Yesterday was a significant day in Parliament. We had an Opposition day debate, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central contributed skilfully, about precisely this issue. The hon. Member for Poole said that this will inevitably get wrapped up in the wider conversation about leaving the EU, which I think is reasonable. We know that nuclear is one of the sectors on the list of impact assessments. The debate yesterday and the comprehensive vote showed the settled will of Parliament for those assessments to be revealed. Nowhere is that more important than in this area, because people need that assurance. That needs to be triangulated, too, not only by the Government’s own sense of impact but by sharing the full consultation. We more than dipped our toe into this—we had a day’s worth of experience—on Tuesday, when we talked to people with a variety of interests in the sector. We heard a lot of very important,  and in some cases quite concerning, messages. We need to see the whole consultation, as the Bill continues its passage.
The issue came up at the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee yesterday. People need to know that they will be kept safe; that is obvious. They also need to know what this will mean in pounds and pence and what resources the ONR will need, compared with the resources that go into Euratom. People would then have a full understanding of what has happened and why, and whether that has been a good thing.
Anything that involves leaving the EU is necessarily hotly contested space. The things we talk about are not necessarily so hotly contested politically. I think Members across the House would want to have a sensible conversation about this, as we have done today, and I do not think there is much political opportunity or votes in our constituencies—certainly not for me. People need to know that they are safe, and they need to know the financial consequences of the legislation. The only way to do that is by accepting amendment 4, which is very helpful, and underpin it with amendments 12 and 13, to ensure we have full transparency.

Richard Harrington: I am sorry to be pedantic in front of the hon. Lady. It might affect the safeguards, which are to do with non-proliferation and so on, not the safety. If there were not enough inspectors to do safety, it would have the effect the hon. Lady mentioned, but this particular Bill it is to do with safeguards. I know that sounds like one word against the other, but it is a different regime—albeit a very good one, and it also has skill recruitment issues, just like any other. I am not making light of her comment, but in this case it is not safety in the sense of health and safety— people getting hurt or leaks—important though that is, but it would certainly affect the safeguards regime if the recruitment and other things were not done properly, which is why we have started this straight away.

Richard Harrington: I was brought up in Sheffield so it is all the south of England to me. Maybe I misunderstood the question asked by the hon. Member for Nottingham North, but I thought he was asking whether there would be enough staff in place, as opposed to whether we would have a suitable regime ready by the end of it. If I misunderstood him, I did not mean to. That is why I made the point that it is impossible to tell—because it is a recruitment programme.
That is why I made the point that it is impossible to tell—because it is a recruitment programme. When I said the word “hope” to the hon. Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves), the Chair of the Select Committee on Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, she said that when she buys a lottery ticket she hopes she will win. I had to point out that it was not that kind of hope but an informed hope based on a proper recruitment and resources plan, which will be in the assessment that is wanted. However, that has to be based on assumptions. Everything has to be based on assumptions.
Although I do not make light of the number of people involved—be it 15, 30 or whatever—it is not hundreds or thousands of people. It is in the ONR’s sphere of what it estimates. To return to the example from my hon. Friend the Member for Copeland about Sellafield, it could be that a lot of people apply for these jobs and they are partly qualified because of their degrees and other experiences, so the recruitment could go more quickly than expected. Like in any forecast, we need to make assessments, but I have no reason to believe that there will be a problem with recruitment. The first phase has already started. In January 2018 it goes on to the next phase, and that has been planned for properly.

Richard Harrington: That is a typically sensible suggestion from the hon. Gentleman. I will give that some consideration as to form or whatever, if he will bear with me. I remind hon. Members that the Bill already requires the Government to consult with the ONR and other persons that the Secretary of State considers appropriate. I know it may or must seem appropriate, but the intention is to consult widely.
On ONR capacity, which is the core of many of the amendments, I recognise the importance of transparency and the need for Parliament to be assured that the ONR is adequately resourced to set up the absolutely critical domestic civil nuclear safeguards regime. I have continually stated that we will allocate to the ONR the funding  necessary to set up the regime. We have been transparent about the costs and resources of setting up the regime. Current estimates of the set-up costs are set out in the explanatory notes to the Bill. They are under my file, but from memory they are about £10 million in set-up costs and about that annually, which is roughly the cost of Euratom at the moment to perform the same function. I know the figures are approximate, but they give hon. Members a perception of the scale.
The relevant section is “Financial implications of the Bill”, which I will read now, in case hon. Members do not have it in front of them—they will not have to scurry around for it. It says:
“The public expenditure resulting from the Bill are the cost of the establishment and operation of the new regime by the ONR in line with the regulations that will be made under the powers in the Bill.”
That is the £10 million. It continues:
“The costs to set up a UK domestic safeguards regime (which remain subject to further analysis) are potentially up to £10m. This would include procurement of a new IT system, recruitment and training of …inspectors and strengthening institutional capacity to deliver the project. This cost can be met from within BEIS’s Spending Review allocations. The cost of any equipment currently in the United Kingdom but belonging to Euratom is a matter currently under negotiation with the European Union.”
Ideally, we will want to purchase the kit: the cameras, recording equipment and other electronic surveillance equipment and so on. It continues:
“The regime is also likely to involve an ongoing cost of around £10m a year—
sorry, I have said this before, but just to confirm—
“which is in line with the United Kingdom’s current cost of Euratom safeguards activity in the United Kingdom.”
The Office for Nuclear Regulation has also been clear, in evidence to the Committee, and to the Department, about the resources required. The amount has not just come out of the blue. We are working closely together to ensure that the needs of the ONR are met. My Department has already agreed to provide funding for initial work undertaken by the ONR on scoping and additional recruitment.
The ONR currently anticipates that the next tranche of recruitment will be in 2017. To correct myself, when I previously referred to the beginning of 2017 I was mixing it up with the current round; it will be at the end of 2017. That is what it has asked us for; it is not the Government imposing anything or saying we think it is how it should proceed. It is committed to doing whatever recruitment is necessary for what it knows it has to do. I hope that I have assured hon. Members that we are working closely with ONR to ensure that sufficient resource and capacity will be in place to carry out the work needed. It is unnecessary to add to the Bill the level of detail in the amendment. It would not make any difference to a programme that is already costed and proceeding.
On amendments 12 and 13 and the issue of consultation more broadly, the Opposition made some valid points, and I agree wholeheartedly that, as was said on Second Reading as well as today in Committee, consultation is vital in the development of any regulatory system—and even more so when it concerns something of such national importance. As the hon. Member for Nottingham North said, what is important may not be the thing that  makes newspaper headlines; the general public may not realise something is important, but here we can all agree that this matter is critical.
I hope that Members on both sides of the Committee will agree that there have been great improvements in recent history in the working relationship between all Governments—I am not making a point just about the present Government—and the nuclear industry regulator, as well as with a wide range of stakeholders across the industry. Probably the main stakeholder, of course, is Lord Hutton, the former Secretary of State in the precursor Department to mine—and, in fact, nearly every other Department; it is very much a cross-party kind of industry. People listening to our proceedings might have felt that the Government had a disagreement with the two unions that gave evidence, but in reality there is far more in common between us—as there is in Committee today—than there are differences.
A good relationship is important, but I accept that that does not stand in the place of appropriate legislative mechanisms for consultation: I do not think that it is just a question of a few people getting around a table and having a meeting. I accept that consultation must be statutory; and, quite properly, it is. Future regimes or Governments, and future stakeholders, might have different views about each other. A Government who did not want a nuclear industry might behave differently, and so might a nuclear industry that did not want such a Government. I accept that things must be formalised.
The Bill therefore places clear requirements on the Government to consult. We have already made it clear that the development of the regulations that underpin the Bill will be subject to detailed consultation with the regulator and industry. Hon. Members will be aware that it is policy for such consultations to be made public, and we intend to do so in this case.